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A New Compact for Higher Education in Virginia
October 22, 2003
Robert B. Archibald
David H. Feldman
College of William and Mary
1. Introduction
This brief paper describes a plan to restructure the relationship between statesupported colleges and universities and the Commonwealth of Virginia. Since 2001,
state-supported colleges and universities have had to absorb significant budget cuts as the
state brought its expenditures in line with its revenues. The institutions have been
allowed to raise tuition to soften the effect of these budget cuts. As a result, the
percentage of each institution’s budget supported by state general fund appropriations has
declined. We have been here before.
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The figure above shows the recent history of the percentage of Education and
General (E&G) expenditures supported by state general fund appropriations for the
College of William and Mary. While the levels would vary by institution, the general
shape of the line is similar for any state-supported institution. The figure shows that
state support falls as a share of expenditures during and after recessions (1982-1984,
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1990-1991, and 2001- 200?). The share of state support recovers during cyclical
expansions but, perhaps surprisingly, not to its previous levels. The result is that the
share of state support has ratcheted down over time.
This picture does not bring smiles to the faces on campuses or at the state capitol.
The pattern it shows does not suggest evil intent on anyone’s part. It reflects the
combination of four forces: (1) periodic declines in state revenues, (2) legitimate
demands on state revenues for purposes other than supporting higher education, (3) a
requirement to balance the biannual state budget, and (4) the fact that increases in college
tuition are politically more palatable than increases in other state revenues. The figure
shows clearly how colleges and universities have become progressively more dependent
on direct charges to students and support from private donors. The forces driving this
change are not likely to stop. It is time for all the parties to recognize this and manage
the changes these forces imply.
When the percentage of state support declines below 50% college administrators
are inclined to say they are “state-assisted rather than state-supported.” This semantic
distinction is not very useful, because it does not describe any real change in the
relationship between the state and the institution. In this paper, we describe a plan to
create a real difference between what we will call a state-allied institution and the current
state-supported model. This plan would meet the objectives of the state, and of the
institutions themselves, better than the current system.
2. The Foundations of a new Compact for Higher Education in Virginia
State-Allied Institutions as Public-Private Partnerships – The first element of
the compact is a new model of a state-allied college or university as a public-private
partnership. Essentially, each state-allied institution would have to be recreated as a new
legal entity. This legal entity would have a governing board partially chosen by the
governor and partially chosen by the institution. State-supported colleges and
universities currently have active private fund raising arms that are, for many purposes,
completely separate from their state-supported operations. The new legal entity would
combine the private and state portions of the current institutions. The legal details and
protections associated with this combination are beyond the scope of this paper, but we
do not believe that they include any deal breakers.
This new creation – the state-allied institution – would receive private funds in the
form of donations and tuition. The major change involves tuition. Tuition payments
currently are state revenue, called non-general fund revenue. This would not be true
under the new arrangement. This change is important for two reasons. First, since tuition
payments are state revenue, there are no guarantees that the institution will be able to use
them. In times of budget duress, the state can claim any state revenue. This makes it
very hard for institutions to plan and is very damaging to the educational program when
the state has to claim these funds.
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Colleges and universities operate in markets that mix private and public
institutions. These markets have little respect for state boundaries, and they are very
dependent on easily transferred human talent. College personnel can teach, perform
research, or serve as administrators at private institutions and at state-supported
institutions in other states. Our publicly supported institutions also compete with major
corporations, banks, law firms, and a myriad other private and public sector employers.
Talented individuals are mobile, and when state budget necessities keep salaries fixed
and facilities in disrepair they are more likely to move. Virginia’s budget problems often
coincide with fiscal difficulties in other states, but they are not shared evenly, and private
colleges and universities are exempt from most of the problems.
The fact that colleges and universities are so dependent on people with mobile
talents makes life at a state-supported institution like a roller coaster ride. When state
resources are flowing, institutions build new programs, hire very talented faculty and
administrators, and increase educational opportunities for their students. When resource
flows slow or reverse, programs have to be eliminated, the faculty and administrators the
institution most wants to keep may leave, and the educational opportunities for students
dry up. The uncertainty the state budget process introduces makes long range planning
difficult, which complicates the institution's problems in maintaining or increasing the
quality of its programs.
Second, since tuition payments are state revenue, the state, for political reasons,
can control tuition levels. We believe that tuition should be viewed as a price, and it is
not usually a good idea to set prices politically. Central control of tuition, through
freezes and reductions, is a relatively new phenomenon in Virginia. And yet in its short
history, central control already has created problems. State budget procedures call for
institutions to submit a set of new initiatives for possible state funding. When institutions
controlled their own tuition, they could plan ahead to ensure that sufficient revenues were
available to incorporate any state-funded new initiatives without having to constrain core
activities. After tuition was frozen, however, most incremental funding was tied to new
initiatives. The result of a few years of this practice is a quite predictable shortfall in
funds needed to carry out the basic mission of the state-supported institutions. In the
language used in Virginia this is called the “base budget adequacy” problem.
With control of their own tuition, and assurance that they alone could spend
tuition revenues, institutions could avoid base budget adequacy problems. In addition,
the state college system includes institutions with very different missions and that face
very different market conditions. A centrally controlled tuition policy is very unlikely to
have the flexibility to be appropriate for each institution.
At a national level, the combination of budget stringency coupled with political
control of tuition increases seriously threatens the quality of public institutions. For
every dollar private institutions spend per student, public colleges and universities today
spend less than 55 cents, down from 70 cents in 1979.
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Funding Students Not Institutions – To this point, the appeal of the plan to
institutions is clear. They get more autonomy to make decisions, in particular decisions
regarding tuition. What is in it for the state? To answer this question, we need to
describe how the state would fund higher education under a system of state-allied
institutions. Our plan calls for the state to fund students directly instead of indirectly as it
does now.
Currently the commonwealth gives three kinds of assistance to students: (1)
need-based financial aid, (2) across-the-board subsidies to in-state students in the form of
reduced tuition made possible by state appropriations covering operating costs, and (3)
across-the-board subsidies to all students made possible by state appropriations for
buildings and other capital.
The first kind of aid generally is available to students from low-income families
and comes to the student directly. Through grants and subsidized loans the federal
government provides a large amount of financial aid. State funds supplement this aid,
but need-based financial aid does not represent a very large share of state funding for
higher education. Virginia is not very different from most states. Spending on needbased financial aid is less than 5% of Virginia appropriation for higher education
operating costs.
The second kind of aid is the across-the-board subsidy to operating costs that is
available to any student qualifying for in-state status. By law, out-of-state students
attending state-supported colleges and universities in Virginia have to pay an amount that
meets or exceeds the full operating cost of providing their education. Because the state
provides funds directly to the institutions, in-state students pay significantly less than the
full cost of their education. In the 2001-2002 academic year the general fund subsidy for
operating costs for an in-state student averaged over $8,750 at four-year institutions.1
This subsidy allows the institutions to charge in-state students a significantly lower
tuition than they charge out-of-state students. Unlike financial aid, this subsidy is
available to students regardless of their income. The last form of aid is the subsidy
implicit in state funding for campus buildings and other capital projects. This subsidy is
provided to all students, in-state and out-of-state. An institution’s tuition would have to
be higher if it financed its own buildings.
Our plan calls for the commonwealth to give the first two kinds of aid directly to
students. This would change the way the state delivers across-the-board aid for
operations. Under our plan every in-state student who enrolls at a state-allied college or
university would be eligible for a tuition grant. The size of the tuition grant would be
determined by the state. Financially, the proposed system could be equivalent to the
existing system. A simple example will help illustrate the change we propose. In this
example, the institution currently charges $5,000 to each in-state student. Under the new
1

All data are from the State Council of Higher Education for the 2001-2002 academic year. There are
117,436 full time equivalent in-state students at four-year institutions. The total general fund expenditures
at four-year institutions were $1,029,711,084. This yields general funds expenditure of $8,768 per full-time
equivalent in-state student.
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system, the institution would raise its in-state tuition to $13,750. In-state students would
not be hurt by the change, however, because they would all qualify for a state tuition
grant of $8,750. This makes the net tuition charge to the students, the per student costs to
the state, and the per student revenue of the institutions the same under both systems.

In-state annual tuition
State appropriation (per student)
Tuition Grant
Net Tuition
Revenue (per student)
Cost to the State (per student)

Existing System
5,000
8,750
0
5,000
13,750
8,750

New Compact
13,750
0
8,750
5,000
13,750
8,750

While the economics of the two systems are very similar, the politics are very
different. In the current system, the across-the-board subsidy covering operating costs is
hidden. It is given directly to the colleges and universities. The fact that much of this
subsidy goes to students from high-income families with little, if any, need for a subsidy
is not apparent. Providing the subsidy directly to students will make the choice between
across-the-board subsidies and need-based financial aid much more transparent.
In addition, under the current system, college presidents spend quite a bit of time
lobbying the state to increase their institution’s budget in good times and preserve it in
bad times. Perhaps without recognizing it, these college presidents are lobbying for
increases in the across-the-board subsidy. If they are successful in obtaining these
increases, some of the money they obtain may well have gone to increased need-based
aid. Under the new compact, the major champions for across-the-board subsidies lose
their incentive to lobby for this type of aid. It is quite likely that the mix between needbased aid and across-the-board subsidies would change in favor of more need-based aid.
This is something that many experts on financial aid policy have advocated for some
time.
Shifting the method of subsidization from tuition-reduction to direct student
grants benefits the Commonwealth in three ways. First, like the schools themselves the
Commonwealth has a stake in preserving access to higher education and in maintaining
the high quality of its institutions. Under the current system, when the state cuts E&G
funding, its public universities face an unpleasant set of choices. At least initially, tuition
increases rarely recoup the lost revenues, so the quality of their programs begins to suffer.
If financial aid is not increased, higher tuition shrinks the pool of talented in-state
students who can afford a university education. Institutions elsewhere, such as the
University of Wisconsin, have tried to maintain the quality of their program by reducing
the quantity of spaces available for in-state students. Directly reducing access to higher
education is not an acceptable answer either. Classifying tuition as school revenue, and
de-politicizing it, insulates the state’s colleges and universities from much of the harm
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done by the state financing roller coaster. In that sense it mitigates the harsh quantityquality choice faced by schools in a climate of budget austerity.
Second, the transparency of providing direct student subsidies may help facilitate
decreases in state spending on higher education when budget pressures dictate. Reducing
a subsidy that is paid to every student, some of whom have no demonstrated need, may
be easier than taking funds away from institutions. When an institution’s budget is
reduced, the institution’s representatives, its administration, alumni, and students descend
upon Richmond lobbying to restore the cuts. Given that members of the legislature often
are alumni, these lobbying efforts frequently succeed in moderating or reversing the cuts.
On the other hand, the same cut could be achieved by reducing the across-the-board
portion of the student grant while still meeting an accepted percentage of student need.
Lobbying would still occur, but it would be on behalf of families with high incomes who
had just lost some of their state subsidy. While this group would no doubt include many
students, the transparency of their pleas for a constant subsidy at a time of budget crisis
would make the argument difficult.
Our proposal makes it clear just what the government is subsidizing when it
directly funds state-supported institutions. Nobel Prize winning economist Milton
Friedman asked the question this way in 1968, “Why should the families in Watts pay
taxes to subsidize the families in Beverly Hills who send their children to UCLA?” This
is a very good question. We think it will be easier for the state to make clear decisions
about just how far it wants to reduce its support for higher education if it is clear who
receives this support and in what form.
The third advantage the tuition grant system offers the state is control over the
amount of state subsidy each student is eligible to receive. Under the current system, a
student can qualify for subsidized in-state tuition for credits well in excess of the number
needed for graduation, or for his or her third master’s degree. While education is a good
thing, the state is not obligated to subsidize multiple degrees at a particular level. The
state may wish to limit the number of semester hours for which a particular student is
eligible to receive a tuition grant. These limits should be liberal, leaving room for
mistakes and experimentation, but it is sensible for there to be limits. At present there is
no limit on the amount of state subsidy that goes to individual students.
Adopting tuition grants as the only form of state support for operating expenses
will change the incentives facing institutions in many ways. For example, the proposed
system treats institutional growth quite differently than the existing system. Currently, an
institution that chooses to grow does so at some peril because its state appropriation may
not grow as rapidly as its student body. If the state appropriation does not increase with
growth in in-state students, it is not to the financial advantage for an institution to
increase the number of in-state students it admits. On the other hand, there is no financial
penalty for growth in the out-of-state student body. As a result, the current system has an
incentive for institutions to decrease the percentage of their student body coming from
the Commonwealth. Because of this, in some instances, institutions are planning to meet
the current budget cuts by trying to attract more out-of-state students. The proposed
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system changes this. If the state made a commitment to fund tuition grants for all in-state
students, growth in in-state students would be, from a financial viewpoint, as beneficial
as growth in out-of-state students.
If the Commonwealth made an open-ended commitment to fund tuition grants, the
incentives for institutional growth would be quite strong. More likely, and preferably, the
state would limit the number of grants for each institution. These limits should be set
several years in advance both to make the Commonwealth’s financial commitments more
predictable and to enhance the institution’s ability to plan for any growth. Also, the
discussion surrounding the projected size of an institution’s student body would allow the
state to coordinate plans for capital projects needed for the institution to accommodate
planned growth.
Determining the size of the tuition grant will be difficult. There is some appeal to
the notion that the tuition grants should be the same for all institutions. In this case the
system will be very simple to explain to prospective students. This is unlikely to be
accepted by institutions because the current size of the per-student across-the-board
subsidy varies considerably by institution. Institutions will argue that it would be unfair
for all institutions to have the same tuition grant because it is more expensive to produce
certain educational programs, for example Ph.D. programs, than it is others. This means
that a system based on tuition grants that differs by type of institution (tiers) is likely to
be the fairest system.
The classification of institutions into tiers will be politically very sensitive, but we
think that it is possible to create such a system, especially if the schools that currently
receive the smallest per-student appropriation from the state see an increase in the new
system. It will be important for the system to recognize occasional changes in the
mission of institutions, but it is also important for these changes to be made as part of a
state approved plan for the system of education. Once the tiers are determined, it will be
important for them to be set for some time. The placement of institutions in tiers should
not be a source of continual political discussion.2
We suggest also that the system should have some flexibility regarding the acrossthe-board subsidy for capital. At present, institutions submit plans for new capital
projects to the state in priority order. The political process then determines which
projects can be funded in a given year. The uncertainty on the capital side associated
with the timing of capital spending is at times more difficult for a college or university
than the uncertainty in operating funds.

2

There are three institutions in the Commonwealth that might be able to make a case for continuing to have
a state appropriation as well as having their students eligible for tuition grants. Norfolk State and Virginia
State, the two historically black institutions in the state, currently receive higher than the average state
appropriation per student. This treatment is consistent with a recognition that the group of students these
institutions educate is very expensive to deal with. Virginia Military Institute also receives a higher than
average state appropriation per student. This is consistent with a very expensive educational model at a
military academy. We think that it would be appropriate to continue to treat these institutions differently
than the others.
7

A state-allied institution might want to bring a building on line well before the
political process would authorize it. Because of this, state-allied institutions would be
better off if they had the authority to undertake capital projects they could finance on
their own. If the institution thinks that a new facility or a building renovation will
significantly enhance the quality of the education it can offer, it might well make the
decision to add the costs of financing the project to its tuition. In other cases a stateallied institution might well be willing to wait for the political process to determine the
timing of capital spending. Finally, there is no reason to think of capital projects as all or
nothing. The state and a state-allied institution could share the costs of a capital project.
The state of Delaware routinely engages in this sort of cost sharing with the University of
Delaware. The important point here is that institutions should have the ability, if they can
finance it, to control the pace of building on their campuses.
Setting Tuition at a State-Allied College or University - Under the new plan a
state-allied college or university would be free to set tuition as it saw fit. When the new
plan is inaugurated tuition would increase just as it has when the state reduced its general
fund support in the past. Since general fund support for operations is completely
eliminated under the new plan, as our example above illustrated, the list-price tuition
increase could be quite dramatic. Yet it is important to note that the increase in net
tuition -- the list-price tuition minus a student’s tuition grant -- would be very modest on
average. In fact, if the tuition grant turns out to be identical to an in-state student’s share
of the general fund appropriation, there would be no change in net tuition.
More likely, the new system would be inaugurated as part of a plan to reduce state
expenditures, so the tuition grant would be less than an in-state student’s share of the
general fund appropriation for operations. As long as there were sufficient increases in
state spending for need-based grants, access to higher education would not change. The
same set of students would be able to afford a higher education. The major change is that
the state would be providing a smaller average subsidy to Virginia students.
One common objection to institutions gaining free control of tuition is that highly
selective schools might be able to raise net tuition significantly. As long as these schools
agree to maintain current high percentages of in-state students, significant tuition hikes
are unlikely. There are a large number of in-state and out-of-state colleges and
universities vying for Virginia's high quality students. Ensuring a high quality student
body is very important to college faculty and administrations. To succeed in this
competition, an institution has to present to students an appealing price/quality
combination. Under the new plan, because of the tuition grant, state-allied colleges and
universities would maintain their current advantage in this competition compared to instate private institutions and out-of-state institutions. A state-allied school that raised
tuition too much would erode this advantage, and knowledge of this would provide a
brake on any one institution’s desire to raise tuition.
There are great advantages to institutions in moving to a system that allows them
to set tuition with the understanding that this tuition forms a secure revenue base. As we
have argued, under such a system they could make much more realistic long-range plans
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than they can when they are directly affected by the state budget roller coaster. The
effect of being dependent on state funds would be limited. There would be no more
uncertainty associated with changing state appropriations for operations. Need-based
grants could be a target of state budget cuts, but institutions could offset these if the cuts
adversely affected the quality of the in-state applicant pool.3 There would still be some
uncertainty about the timing of capital projects, but if the institution felt it could afford to
accept some of the costs of these projects, it could limit this effect too.
Under the new plan, budget uncertainties are shifted to the students through the
size of the tuition grant. The state could limit the adverse consequences of this type of
uncertainty by fixing the size of the tuition grant by student cohort. Under such a plan,
the size of the tuition grant for first year college students would be set for those students
for four years. The next year’s first year students might have a different sized grant, but
it too would be fixed for four years. This way a student could have a better sense of what
his or her state support would be for an entire college career. We should hasten to add
that the fact that students bear the brunt of the budget uncertainty is not a major change.
Properly understood it is a change in timing only. Suppose that the state reduces its
budget for higher education the equivalent of $200 per student. Under the existing
system, in the year of the cut, the institutions will have to absorb the cut by reducing
spending. In the following year, the institutions will increase tuition, shifting the costs to
students. Under the new plan, the students feel the cut the first year as well as the second
one. The only difference is the timing.
It is important to point out that the relationship between state support and college
tuition would be changed considerably under the new plan. Currently, when state support
for operations is reduced, tuition increases. Otherwise the institution has to cut the
quality of its offerings or reduce the number of places for in-state students whose tuition
in no way reflects the cost of their education. Under the new plan, it is quite possible that
just the reverse might happen. If an institution holds its list-price tuition fixed, its net
price would rise with a decrease in the tuition grant. Importantly, however, the tuition
revenue of the institution would not be affected. There is no automatic need to increase
tuition. In some competitive situations, an institution might not be able to thrive with a
higher net price for Virginia students. Such an institution might choose to decrease its
list-price tuition or at least moderate its planned increase. Market pressures, based on the
competition from other institutions, will strongly affect tuition.
3. What the New Compact Is and What It Isn’t
The new compact for state-allied colleges and universities is not a plan to
privatize the current set of state-supported institutions. The state-allied institutions would
agree to keep the same in-state/out-of-state ratios for their student bodies that they
currently have. The Commonwealth of Virginia has an important interest in seeing that
opportunities for a good higher education are available for the residents of Virginia. The
3

To the extent that state-allied colleges and universities still tried to influence the state legislature, it would
be in their best interest to try to lobby for increases in need-based aid.
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Commonwealth has made major investments in college campuses around the state as well
as continuing appropriations for operating funds to see that these educational
opportunities are available. This plan does not suggest that the Commonwealth is getting
out of the higher education business. It does, however, recognize that public funding for
operating its higher education system is likely to decline as a share of the total cost of
education. This will mean that more of the cost of acquiring a higher education has to be
borne by students. The plan is an attempt to accommodate this trend by giving
institutions more freedom to deal with the change.
While the compact is not a privatization plan, it does provide for the colleges and
universities some of the freedom enjoyed by private institutions. For example, this plan
redirects the activities of the supporters of the institutions in a productive way. Currently,
considerable time and effort are expended protecting the budget in Richmond. Much of
this lobbying is, in a polite way, part of a competition among the state-supported colleges
and universities over a relatively fixed amount of money for higher education. Such
activity would not be necessary under the new plan – it replaces this political competition
with market competition. This frees up an institution’s lobbying efforts to be directed
toward increasing its private fund raising.
Private fund raising by state-supported institutions in Virginia has been a success
story. Loyal alumni and other supporters have provided funds that allow Virginia
students to receive a world-class education at a cut-rate price. This type of activity
should be encouraged. Public-private partnerships such as the state-allied institutions
described here should be even more attractive to potential donors. In the current
situation, some donors feel that they are being asked to bail out the state, or that their
donation will allow the state to cut the institution’s budget. With the relationship
between the state and its institutions clarified, such problems disappear. As a separate
legal entity, the state-allied institution also may become eligible for foundation support
and grants unavailable to the traditional state-supported college or university.
For the state-allied institutions to have the autonomy they need to compete, they
must have more budget independence than currently exists. College and university
employees currently are state employees and receive some state-supported fringe
benefits; most notably they are eligible for state retirement. Budget autonomy need not
hurt existing employees. State-allied institutions could provide non-state retirement
options for their employees while maintaining the state plans for those who prefer to
remain within the state system. In addition, as state agencies, colleges and universities
are bound by some state restrictions in areas such as procurement. The new plan would
simply accelerate current plans to decentralize decision-making. These changes should
be encouraged in any event.
This proposal is not a finished policy statement. There are many details to be
worked out. Our hope is that this document will start a discussion. The time is right.
Slowly and haphazardly, state support for higher education clearly is diminishing.
Inevitably this puts more of the burden of financing higher education on students. We
could be like Pollyanna and think that this trend will reverse itself, but we think it is
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better to design a system that faces up to the long-term budget realities. We think a
system that shifts state funding from institutions to students and creates state-allied
institutions with much more autonomy to manage their own affairs will allow higher
education in Virginia to flourish.
4. Summary
The two essential features of this plan are the creation of new legal entities that
would control revenues from tuition and endowment funds, and making Virginia students
the direct recipients of state grants for higher education. These changes would give the
schools and the state direct control over the types of decisions that are arguably the most
appropriate for each to make.
Virginia’s colleges and universities would gain a predictable revenue stream for
long-range planning and an enhanced ability to attract endowment funds and grants.
Secure revenues would help ensure that the institutions could continue to offer a topquality education in a very competitive higher education market. The power to set tuition
still would be constrained by the market and by the continuing requirement to enroll a
high percentage of in-state students. A substantial in-state tuition discount likely would
remain, this time determined by the schools themselves who would have to trade off the
need for more revenue against the desire to maintain a high-quality and diverse set of instate students.
The state would control the size of its direct contribution to in-state students, and
how that aid is allocated between need-based grants and across-the-board grants. In a
time of budget crisis, or in an environment in which other demands on state funding are
rising in priority, the state could adjust its commitment to higher education without
damaging the institutions that provide it.
If the new state-allied institutions are better off, and the state contribution to
subsidizing higher education shrinks, who pays the cost of this reform plan? Since the
bulk of state aid currently consists of hidden across-the-board subsidies, this plan likely
transfers some of the burden of funding higher education from the state to higher-income
Virginia families. In times of budget crisis, the most sensible place to cut higher
education spending would be in the across-the-board portion of student grants. If needbased aid were spared, the burden of cuts would be concentrated on those who could
most afford it.
Yet this burden shift likely will be mitigated by a number of important byproducts of the plan. Vesting the state subsidy in students themselves will reduce the
wasteful lobbying by colleges and universities over their share of the fixed state support
budget. Those same college resources will be redirected toward productive activities to
increase private sector support. Increased private support will reduce dependence on
tuition revenue and enable schools to absorb more of the cost of providing their services.
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Getting off of the state funding roller coaster is essential if Virginia’s colleges and
universities are to maintain or increase their quality relative to peer institutions
elsewhere. If schools control their own revenues and manage the type and timing of their
capital projects they will be far better positioned to compete for the talented students and
highly skilled professionals who determine their institution’s quality. Enhancing that
quality is another dividend that benefits all Virginia students regardless of their ability to
pay.

12

